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INTRODUCTION 
 
How do corporate charitable contributions affect corporate financial performance? 
Instrumental stakeholder theory posits that corporate giving can lead to high levels of corporate 
financial performance through improved stakeholder relations. In contrast, agency theory 
suggests that corporate giving diverts valuable corporate resources and inhibits corporate 
financial performance. Extant empirical studies that have examined the relationship found 
inconclusive results. We depart from and extend the existing literature in two main aspects. First, 
building upon the instrumental stakeholder argument and agency perspective, we develop the 
argument that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between corporate charitable giving and 
corporate financial performance. Second, we predict that the inverse U-shaped relationship 
changes over time: firms that engage in moderate amounts of giving in a later period would have 
a higher level of financial performance than those in an earlier period. The hypotheses are tested 
with a longitudinal data set of corporate giving from 1984 to 1999, providing strong support for 
our predictions.   
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
 
The Curvilinear Relationship between Corporate Giving and Financial Performance 
 
Building upon and extending instrumental stakeholder theory, we posit that the positive 
effect of corporate giving on corporate financial performance can be better understood through 
the concept of organizational identity and its legitimized form, corporate reputation. In particular, 
corporate giving influences internal stakeholders (e.g., existing employees) through enhancing 
their organizational identification, and external stakeholders (e.g., customers, investors, potential 
future employees, etc.) through improving organizational reputation. Organizational 
identification and reputation enable firms to keep a trusting, cooperative relationship with 
stakeholders, which, in turn, increases firms’ financial performance (Graves & Waddock, 1994; 
Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Scott & Lane, 2000). Thus, corporate giving will have a positive 
effect on corporate financial performance.  
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This perspective, however, has overlooked the costs associated with corporate giving or 
implicitly assumed that the increased costs from engaging in corporate giving may not be 
significant enough to directly harm firms’ competitive positions and financial performance. 
However, although it might be reasonable to not consider the cost aspect at low levels of 
corporate giving, when corporate giving increases up to a certain level, the costs can no longer be 
overlooked. First, high levels of corporate giving divert valuable corporate resources and thus 
impose direct costs on firms (Keim, 1978; Ullman, 1985). The costs that arise from corporate 
giving are not limited to expenditures in corporate financial and physical resources such as 
money and facilities. They also include costs associated with human resources. Another 
opposing dynamic that needs to be simultaneously considered is that too high levels of corporate 
giving are also likely to be interpreted as a signal that the firm has some severe agency problems 
(cf. Wright & Ferris, 1997). It has been demonstrated in the literature that high levels of slack 
resources positively affect subsequent corporate giving (Preston & O’Bannon, 1997; Seifert, 
Morris, & Bartkus, 2004). Thus excessive giving may be linked to a large amount of slack 
resources, which are likely to promote managers’ opportunistic behaviors (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).   
If all of the above countervailing forces are simultaneously considered, we expect that a 
curvilinear relationship between corporate giving and financial performance should emerge. 
Corporate giving first promotes organizational identification and corporate reputation and 
attracts stakeholders to actively participate in the firm. But with the amount of giving increasing 
to a sufficiently high level, this effect is offset by increased direct and labor costs, and an 
increased stakeholder concern about the firm’s potential agency problems. These arguments 
suggest that there is an intermediate level of corporate giving that is optimal for corporate 
financial performance. This leads to: 
Hypothesis 1: The level of corporate giving and corporate financial performance have an 
inverse U-shaped curvilinear relationship. 
 
The Moderating Effect of Time on the Giving-Performance Relationship 
 
The relationship between corporate giving and financial performance may change over 
time, with the increasing awareness of corporate giving by stakeholders and the instrumental use 
of corporate giving by firms. In an earlier period, although there may still exist an inverse U-
shaped relationship, we expect that the marginal performance benefits with an increase in the 
amount of corporate giving would not be substantial, albeit positive, since stakeholders were less 
responsive to it and since corporate giving was executed in a less efficient manner. As corporate 
giving becomes a taken-for-granted norm in organizational fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), 
stakeholders respond more actively to it, and firms execute it in a more efficient way (Smith, 
1994). Thus with the evolution of corporate giving over time, an increase in the level of 
corporate giving should generate greater financial benefits. For the same reason, we expect that 
the moderate level of corporate giving that gives rise to optimal financial performance should be 
associated with a higher financial performance in a later period than in an earlier period.  
Another change that may affect the relationship between corporate giving and financial 
performance is that dominant beliefs about corporate governance have shifted toward an 
“agency” model of corporate control (Davis & Thompson, 1994; Useem, 1993, 1996; Westphal 
& Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). The corporate logic draws legitimacy from its 
connection to the logic of capitalist markets (Friedland & Alford, 1991), given its emphasis on 
allocative efficiency through the invisible hand of the stock market rather than through the 
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visible hand of corporate managers (Donaldson, 1990). To the extent that such a market logic of 
resource allocation have become more prevalent in some sections of the economy, stakeholders’ 
concerns for agency problems within corporations become more salient over time. Therefore, as 
we have argued that agency costs become dominant beyond an optimal level of corporate giving, 
we expect that the agency costs are greater in a later period since stakeholders have increased 
their concerns for potential agency problems and these concerns affect their participation in the 
firm. As a result, time further strengthens the negative effect of corporate giving on financial 
performance, when a firm gives beyond the optimal level of corporate giving.   
Thus, although we hypothesized that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
corporate giving and financial performance, the above arguments suggest that such a relationship 
(both the positive and negative effects) should become more pronounced in a later period. 
Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2: Time moderates an inverse U-shaped corporate giving-financial 
performance relationship in such a way that the relationship becomes more pronounced 
over time and firms that engage in a moderate amount of giving will have higher level of 
financial performance in the later sample period than in an earlier sample period. 
 
METHOD 
 
Data and Sample 
 
We used two main data sources in this study: Taft Corporate Giving Directories and 
Standard & Poor’s Compustat. We began our sample selection with the group of firms whose 
charitable giving data appeared in the Taft Corporate Giving Directory. We then merged the 
corporate giving information with Standard & Poor’s Compustat series to obtain more detailed 
financial information for the companies in the dataset. In the end we had a sample of 854 
companies and about 9,125 firm-year observations over the 16 year study period.  
 
Estimation Method  
 
Since our sample only included firms that engaged in corporate charitable giving, there 
may exists sample selection bias if firms do not engage in giving activities randomly. To 
overcome potential sample selection bias, we estimated the effect of the level of charitable 
contributions on corporate financial performance using the Heckman selection model, a two-
stage procedure that corrects for sample selection bias in regression analysis (Heckman, 1976, 
1979). The Heckman model included two equations: the first (selection) equation estimated the 
likelihood of firms engaging in charitable contributions with a probit model for the full sample of 
firms, which includes both our main sample of firms and those in the control group. In the first 
stage, an adjustment term called the “inverse Mills ratio” or “non-selection hazard” (λ) was 
calculated. In the second equation, the sample was limited to our main sample of firms that 
engaged in charitable contributions and was incorporated in the Directory. In this equation, the 
corporate financial performance model was reestimated with the “inverse Mills ratio” included as 
a control variable (Heckman, 1976). Thus, the Heckman two-stage model corrects for sample 
selection bias because parameter estimates from the first-stage probit model, which were based 
on information that represents all firm-years in the population, were incorporated in the second-
stage models.  
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Measurements 
 
The primary dependent variable in this study was corporate financial performance. We 
used three different measures of corporate financial performance: return on assets (ROA), return 
on sales (ROS), and Tobin’s q.  We measured our key independent variable, level of corporate 
charitable contributions, using the dollar amount of charitable giving reported in the Taft 
Corporate Giving Directory. The value of each firm’s contributions was divided by the firm’s 
average sales during the same time period in order to control for the effects of firm size. Our 
moderating variable, time, was measured using an indicator ranging from 0 to 15, with one 
number representing each particular year. In addition, we also included firm size, management’s 
risk tolerance, and organizational slack, R&D and advertising expenditures as control variables. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presented the results from the Heckman model’s second-stage estimation using 
inverse Mills ratios from the first stage probit model (first-stage results were omitted to save 
space) to account for the selection bias with the firms’ participation in charitable contributions 
(although we used three different dependent variables, ROA, ROS, and Tobin’s q, respectively, 
the table only showed the results using Tobin’s q as an illustration). We conducted hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses to test the hypothesized curvilinear relationship between corporate 
charitable giving and corporate financial performance, and the quadratic-by-linear interaction 
between the amount of corporate charitable giving and time.  
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
 Model 1 reported the effects of control variables, including firm risk, firm size, R&D 
intensity, advertising expenditure, and organizational slack, and time. This model served as a 
baseline from which the analysis proceeded. Entering control variables and time into the 
regressions yielded significant equations for ROA (R2=.120, p<.001), ROS (R2=.091, p<.001) 
and Tobin’s q (R2=.160, p<.001). Most of the variables had the expected signs and had 
significant effects. R&D and organizational slack consistently showed significantly positive 
effects on all three measures of financial performance. Firm size was found to affect ROS and 
Tobin’s q positively but showed no significant effect on ROA. Firms with higher risk levels 
(greater debt) tended to have lower levels of financial performance, except for ROS, which had 
insignificant coefficient. The only apparent contradiction across three dependent variables was 
the effect of time, which was shown to have negative effect on ROA and ROS, but the effect 
became positive when Tobin’s q was used as performance measure. In step 2, the main effect of 
the level of corporate giving was entered. But it was found to have no significant effect on ROA 
and Tobin’s q, while a positive and significant effect was found on ROS. 
The quadratic term of giving amount was entered in step 3. The coefficients on both the 
linear giving term and quadratic term were highly significant for all three measures of financial 
performance (at least at p<.001 level for linear terms, at least at p<0.01 level for quadratic terms). 
The positive coefficient sign on the linear term and the negative sign on the quadratic term are 
consistent with the predicted curvilinear (inverse U-shaped) effect of charitable giving on 
corporate financial performance. We gathered further evidence of the role of quadratic charitable 
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giving function in explaining financial performance by comparing the variance explained by the 
models. While including only the level of giving (Model 2) did not yield significantly better 
model fit, including both giving and its squared term led to increases in the R2 term (∆R2 equals 
to 0.012, 0.015, and 0.010, respectively, for three Panels), suggesting better-specified models. F-
tests on the changes in R2 resulting from the addition of the quadratic functions of the giving 
variable suggested that the difference is significant. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was strongly supported 
with all three performance measures.  
In steps 4 and 5, the linear and quadratic-by-linear interactions of charitable giving and 
time were entered. When only linear interactions were added, the interactions of time and 
amount of giving were not found to have significant effects on ROA and ROS, while it had a 
positive and significant effect on Tobin’s q. When quadratic-by-linear interactions were further 
added, for two out of the three performance measures (ROS and Tobin’s q), the coefficients on 
linear interaction became significant with positive signs (at least at p<.01 level), and those on the 
quadratic-by-linear interaction were negative and significant (at least at p < .01 level). 
Furthermore, including time and its interaction terms led to better-specified models for the two 
performance measures, with increases in the R2 of 0.002 and 0.001. F-tests on the changes in R2 
suggested that the differences were significant. These results supported our hypothesis 2, 
indicating that time positively moderates the inverse U-shaped giving-financial performance 
relationship in such a way that the relationship becomes more pronounced over time and firms 
that engage in a moderate amount of giving have higher level of financial performance in the 
later sample period than in an earlier sample period. 
 Of additional interest to us was the inflection point (i.e., the optimal level of corporate 
giving that maximizes financial performance) and how this point changes over time. To address 
this question, we examined the curvilinear giving-financial performance regression curves 
corresponding to an earlier (standardized t = -4.55, one standard deviation below the mean), an 
intermediate (standardized t = 0, mean) and a later (standardized t = 4.55, one standard deviation 
above the mean) time periods respectively (Aiken & West, 1991). We found that there was an 
increase in the values at the inflection points of the regression curves over time. Using Tobin’s q 
for an illustration, at an early time period (t = -4.55), the level of giving at the inflection point 
was 0.023 (2.3 percent of sales). At later periods this value increased to 0.042 (4.2 percent of 
sales) at t = 0 and 0.053 (5.3 percent of sales) at t = 4.55. A consistent pattern was also found 
when ROS was used as the performance measure. These results suggest that, over time, the 
optimal level of corporate giving that maximizes corporate financial performance increases.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This study argued that corporate giving and corporate financial performance have an 
inverse U-shaped relationship. This prediction was strongly supported by our data with both 
accounting- and market-based performance measures. Moreover, due to increased stakeholders’ 
responsiveness to corporate giving and changes in corporate practices over time, we expected 
that the inverse U-shaped relationship would be more pronounced in a later period. We found 
support for this prediction as well.   
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Table 1: GLS results for financial performance (Tobin’s q) 
 
Variables DV: Tobin’s Q 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  
Intercept -1.064***
(0.144) 
-1.064***
(0.144) 
-1.091***
(0.144) 
-1.078***
(0.144) 
-1.073***
(0.144) 
Risk -0.706***
(0.062) 
-0.706***
(0.061) 
-0.672***
(0.061) 
-0.677***
(0.061) 
-0.680***
(0.061) 
Size 0.097***
(0.012) 
0.097***
(0.012) 
0.099***
(0.012) 
0.098***
(0.012) 
0.098***
(0.012) 
R&D 8.193***
(0.400) 
8.201***
(0.402) 
7.976***
(0.401) 
8.012***
(0.400) 
8.011***
(0.400) 
Advertising 4.452*** 
(0.275) 
4.453*** 
(0.275) 
4.381*** 
(0.273) 
4.378*** 
(0.273) 
4.371*** 
(0.273) 
Slack 2.055*** 
(0.122) 
2.056*** 
(0.122) 
2.012*** 
(0.122) 
2.011*** 
(0.121) 
2.015*** 
(0.121) 
Time 0.039***
(0.003) 
0.039***
(0.003) 
0.038***
(0.003) 
0.038***
(0.003) 
0.038***
(0.003) 
Level of Giving  -0.489 
(2.320) 
98.75***
(10.71) 
85.11***
(11.24) 
81.90***
(11.29) 
Giving Squared c   -1.081***
(0.114) 
-1.095***
(0.119) 
-0.980***
(0.153) 
Giving x Time    7.400***
(1.870) 
10.460***
(2.130) 
Giving Squared x Time     -54.62**
(18.01) 
Lambda  
(Inverse Mills Ratio) 
0.791***
(0.078) 
0.792***
(0.078) 
0.797***
(0.077) 
0.797***
(0.077) 
0.797***
(0.077) 
N 8113 8113 8113 8113 8113 
F Value 219.12 191.72 182.29 165.93 151.81 
R2 0.160 0.160 0.170 0.171 0.172 
Model Fitness   ∆R2 vs. Model 1:  ∆R2 vs. Model 3: 
   0.010***  0.002**
 
    a: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
    b: The coefficients shown are multiplied by 103.  
    c: the coefficients shown are multiplied by 10-3. 
    + p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01  ***  p < .001 
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